Selected Essay Responses

Part A

2) Discuss how both Butler and Thomson, can be seen as presenting moral outlooks of subjective, individual freedom that grapple with social, coercive pressures, and really present an alternative vision of public, civil freedoms, or just relations (space) for individual expression.

To her credit, Butler tackles a complex and controversial issue by maintaining that gender performance involves a non-stop series of individual acts and choices which are fundamental aspects of modern life. It is important to note that Butler emphasizes that these individual acts and choices, though, are always situated within and shaped by social pressures and expectations that defy easy analyses. In this regard, Butler explicitly states that gender is not a radical choice or project that reflects a merely individual choice, but neither is it imposed or inscribed upon the individual. In sum, this perspective from Butler concerning gender suggests that moral freedom exists along a continuum that is characterized by multiple dynamic tensions that exist between personal expression and social regulation which are being continuously reevaluated and expressed.

In addition, Butler describes a scenario wherein authentic individual expressions faces punitive consequences and regulatory social conventions when they are perceived as deviating from established and accepted gender norms. This issue has assumed new importance and relevance in Western societies as the mainstream continues the grapple with the concept of gender fluidity and its implications. Indeed, Butler does not regard the current situation as being purely deterministic; rather, she suggests that the very performativity of gender creates possibilities for transformation through subversive performances and breaking or subversive repetition.

This guidance points to a moral vision where individual freedom is not just about escaping social context entirely, but rather about finding ways to challenge and reshape the prevailing cultural field through conscious performance. The fact that this type of response to coercive pressures is needed to help reshape views about civil freedoms is clear evidence that social tension surrounds this debate. In a perfect world, this type of individual freedom would be a given without any social reservations, but the world is not perfect and many people are reluctant to accept significant changes that do not conform to their individual values and worldview.

Again, to her credit, Butlers head-on response to this societal imperfection recognizes the reality of the world as it is and her alternative vision for civil freedom appears to be one where the truth or falsity of gender is recognized as being socially compelled rather than ontologically necessitated. Parsing this bit of scholarly insight requires more than a causal reading, but Butler appears to envision a space where gender could be performed with greater fluidity and without punitive consequences. This is not a strictly individualistic...

In other words, something is not actually a right if it can be taken away legislatively or otherwise and the current prevailing Overton window indicates that the truth or falsity of gender will remain a source of controversy well into the foreseeable future.

It is noteworthy that Butler regards this transformation as being a necessarily collective enterprise rather than a purely individual effort. For instance, she emphasizes that gender acts are always a shared experience and collective action, even if the participants are unaware of this effect. Therefore, Butlers vision of freedom is not about isolated individual expression but about changing the social conditions and conventions that make certain forms of gender expression intelligible or legitimate. This suggests a moral framework where individual freedom is inextricably linked to broader...

…a relevant analogy: just as an acorn is not considered an oak tree, a newly fertilized ovum may not necessarily qualify as a human. The argument proceeds by suggesting that even if the fetus is granted personhood, this does not automatically make abortion morally impermissible. To illustrate this perspective, a thought experiment proposed by Thomson compares the situation to being involuntarily connected to another person for life support. The example raises questions about whether an individuals right to bodily autonomy can be overridden by another persons right to life, ultimately implying that the morality of abortion is more complex than a straightforward application of personhood might suggest (Thomson 1971).

What emerges from the foregoing views of both theorists is an understanding of how seemingly neutral moral principles and social norms can mask forms of coercion that restrict authentic self-development that can help guide -- but not completely resolve -- ongoing debates. Just as Butler reveals how gender norms constrain identity formation while presenting themselves as natural facts, Thomson shows how abstract rights claims (e.g., right to life) can be wielded to impose severe restrictions on bodily autonomy while appearing as universal moral truths. Their combined insight suggests that genuine human flourishing requires not just freedom from explicit coercion, but the positive creation of social spaces where individuals can authentically develop and express themselves without being subjected to normalized forms of control disguised as moral necessity or natural law.

The value of value this outlook lies in its ability to move beyond conventional binary oppositions to consider how policies can create conditions for authentic human development. It suggests that resolving these debates requires attending not just to individual rights but to the social conditions that make meaningful self-determination possible. This approach provides practical guidance while remaining flexible enough to accommodate evolving understandings of human…